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Abstract

As we have seen, philosophy was one of the major contributions of Greek Civilization. It was the Greeks who
gave it its first major impetus as well as its name, "the love of learning." This very phrase embodies the most
important aspects of their contribution to the West: the love of the best or most excellent; the search for
something beyond a description of immediate experience; and the attempt to grasp, in some comprehensive
fashion, both the actual and the ideal, both the given and the possible. In order to accomplish this task
philosophy has, as we have seen, traditionally included the following major subdivisions: epistemology, the
study of how we know; logic, the study of how we think; ethics, the study of how we act; aesthetics, the study
of what we enjoy; and metaphysics, the study of what is real. [excerpt]
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PHILOSOPHICAL MEANING

As we have seen, philosophy was one of the major contri
butions of Greek Civilization. It was the Greeks who gave it
its first major impetus as well as its name, "the love of learn
ing." This very phrase embodies the most important aspects of
their contribution to the West: the love of the best or most
excellent; the search for something beyond a description of
immediate experience; and the attempt to grasp, in some com
prehensive fashion, both the actual and the ideal, both the
given and the possible. In order to accomplish this task
philosophy has, as we have seen, traditionally included the
following major subdivisions: epistemology, the study of how
we know; logic, the study of how we think; ethics, the study of
how we act; aesthetics, the study of what we enjoy; and meta
physics, the study of what is real.
Philosophy can be, and often has been treated in isolation
from the periods of history in which it is found. It can be
studied as concerned solely with its own problems. Treated
this way, its life can be read as a series of constructions,
followed by criticisms of those constructions, which in turn
yield still other constructions, in a somewhat dialectical
fashion. In this manner it is possible to study Hegel's
thought as both a criticism of Enlightenment epistemology and
ethics, and a reconstruction on a new basis.
It is, however, just as possible to treat philosophy as
an integral part of the period of history in which it appears.
It can be studied as concerned primarily with the problems of
its time, as attempting to solve the practical problems with
which its time is faced. Read this way, philosophy can be
treated as a series of answers to the questions which civili
zation asks of it. In this manner it is possible to study
Hegel's philosophy as an attempt to answer the questions raised
by the events of the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon
And each of these two interpretations would be as valid an
approach to philosophy as the other, a fact which gives one a
clue as to its very nature.
The basis^for such a dual attitude can be seen from the
side of philosophy as well as from the side of civilization.
Because philosophy is an attempt to give a total world picture,
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it cannot help but include within its range all of man's concerns:
his economics as well as his aesthetics; his politics as well as
his religion; and his technology as well as his ethics. Philo
sophy brings to bear on all of man's interests both its critical
and its constructive attitudes. Furthermore, and this is particu
larly true in the West, where it has been interested in the actual
as well as the ideal, it evidences that same dynamic restlessness
which has been true of our civilization from its very beginning.
It is therefore quite normal for Western philosophy to make common
cause with civilization in the interests of progress, reform, and
improvement.
On the other hand, there have always been some Western philo
sophers who have refused to accept the mantle of cultural counselor,
or attendant in some intellectual service station. As soon as
philosophy accepts such roles, they argue, it can at best produce
nothing more than a few specifics for its society's ills. This
interpretation of its role would, they insist, deny philosophy's
high calling in a number of ways. First, it would be a rejection
of philosophy's primary work, which is to understand, rather than,
to try to change, things. Second, it would involve philosophy in
a concern for partial and immediate problems, and could not but
result in its never gaining any approximation of an interpretation
of the whole range of human experience. Third, it would mean that
anything which philosophy might offer in the way of a solution
could, at very best, be nothing more than an ideological prescrip
tion, rather than a metaphysical interpretation of what is basic
and real.
Because contemporary civilization's demand for meaning is,
in so many ways, similar to philosophy's own demand for meaning,
these two strands have tended to merge in the minds of a great
many people. This situation helps to account for much of the
present interest in philosophy. At the same time, seldom has the
ambivalence between philosophy and civilization been more evident
than it is today. Indeed, one of the more popular ways of divid
ing philosophers is into those who see it as a means of solving our
' contemporary problems, and those who see it as primarily concerned
with solving its own problems, and only incidentally interested in
those besetting civilization. It is this very tension within
philosophical thought which helps to account for the tremendous
productivity of philosophy today, both in terms of criticism and
of construction. Such a situation can be made all the more clear
if we approach contemporary philosophy historically, starting
with its various reactions to the absolute idealism of Hegel.
Most of the philosophy of the nineteenth century, as well as
much of its religious thought, started with an attack on some aspect
of the great Hegelian synthesis. This system, which claimed to
harmonize science and ethics, which purported to synthesize the
actual and the ideal by means of its dialectic, which offered its
own version of "whatever is is right," which interpreted freedom
as the appreciation of necessity, and which saw in the modern
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national state the Absolute in action, was attacked from both
theoretical and practical points of view. The earliest of the
telling attacks came at the hands of three Continental rebels;
Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche. Despite very great differences
of approach, their attacks on Hegelian thought were alike in
three important respects, and this is true without there having
been any communication between the three men. They went beyond
those who argued that Hegel's attempt to be objective had failed,
to insist that any such attempt at synthesis was by its very
nature impossible. Philosophy was, for them, merely the justifi
cation or expression of some other aspect of human experience
than the intellectual. An objective or rational philosophy like
Hegel's was, in their minds, out of the question. They were also
united in a metaphysical attack on Hegel's idealism. While
Kierkegaard argued for a God who was transcendent, Marx for a
materialistic metaphysics, and Nietzsche for the will to power
as basic, they were at one in insisting that any idealistic meta
physics was impossible.
These two points led to a third area of agreement: for each
of these three thinkers philosophy was primarily a means of chang
ing the situation in which men found themselves. This we have
already noted in Marx' statement that up to his time philosophy
had tried to understand the world, but that the time had come to
change it. While Marx' change was to be achieved by collective
means, those of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were individual, the
former's by religious means, the latter's by aesthetic and ethical.
It is from these three men, as well as from English liberalism,
that we get the strand of contemporary thought which looks upon
philosophy as primarily a means of change and reform.
The twentieth century attacks on Hegel's thought, however,
have been more theoretical than practical, and have focused
largely on his epistemology. This has led to such a concentration
on the problems of meaning and knowing that there is a strong
tendency to say, not only that Hegel's metaphysics was wrong, as
the nineteenth century did, but also to deny the very possibility
of any valid metaphysics at all. It is just impossible, these
contemporaries argue, for anyone to say what reality really
or
what it must be. This current attack is aimed at the metaphysics
of Aristotle as well as of Hegel.
Hegelian thought crossed the English Channel during the postEnlightenment at the same time that it was being attacked on the
Continent, and bade fair to become the leading English philosophy
from its new home in Oxford University. But the epistemological
interests derived from the early British empiricists (Locke,
Berkeley, and Hume), as well as the continuing emphasis on the
free moral person, served to produce a reaction to such absolute
idealism. About 1900 a counter attack was launched from Cambridge
University, ^ere G. E. Moore (1873-1958) began the common-sense
empirical attack on the rationalism of Hegelian epistemology. A
person's ordinary experiences were sufficient, he argued, for him
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to know that he had a pair of hands, and there was no need for
him to go beyond such experiences into the realms of rational
istic speculation to prove that fact. The same argument was
applied to the independent existence of the whole realm of
nature. This approach led Moore to study the language in which
people's thoughts were expressed, in the interest of excising
from it such unnecessary speculative abstractions as reality,
being, idea, and other Hegelian categories. In the attempt to
do this the question which he continually asked was: What do
you mean? What does this statement mean? Answers to these
questions led one back to ordinary experience, he argued, and
not into the realms of abstract speculation.
The work of Moore was of great importance for two reasons.
Through his criticism a number of people were freed of their
allegiance to Hegelian rationalism and absolutism. Further, his
interest in language started a new approach to philosophy. While
earlier thinkers, such as Hobbes and Bentham, had evidenced a
real interest in language, it was Moore who saw philosophy's
main task as the clarification of language. And it is out of
this concern for language that one major aspect of contemporary
British and American philosophy, the analytical, has appeared.
Analytical philosophy has helped to produce w|iat we call semantics, the practical study of the ways in which words are used,
including the effects which certain words, such as democratic,
communist, or politician, produce. While the study of semantics
has been helpful in cfjtain social problems, as well as in advert
ising, the analytical ichool of philosophy has very carefully
avoided any suggestion that theirs is a technique for solving
practical problems.
While Moore and his followers continued their investigation
of ordinary language, Bertrand Riissell (1872) turned the analytical
method in another direction by applying it to different problems.
He agreed with Moore tliat philosophy's work was primarily analytical,
but wished to apply it'to the questions of logic and mathematics
which had always interested him. One of his earliest questions
was why certain matheihatical and geometrical statements (a straight
line is the shortest distance between two points, for example)
should be accepted. Philosophy, as he saw it, was primarily con
cerned with propositlbfts, statements in logical form. But his
study of the Aristotelian type of proposition convinced him that
the older subject-predicate form of statement (A is the cause of
B, for example) was llriadequate for contemporary needs, especially
those of modern mathi^ftiatics and science. Aristotle had viewed the
world as made up of substances with certain attributes, and relations
as one form of attribute. According to him, the statement, "The
boy runs," to be logical must be changed to read, "The boy is the
one who is running," If such relations were to make a difference
they had to be internal and, as an inescaipable result, each thing,
person, or event became nothing mojre than the accumulation of its
qualities and relations, thus losing its own individuality and
integrity.
v
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In this work Russell was joined by his Cambridge mathe
matics teacher, Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), of whom
more later. Together they wrote the Principia Mathematica
(1910-1913), in three volumes, which marked a watershed in the
history of mathematical and logical thought. They made a sus
tained attempt to reduce numbers and their relations to logical
ideas and propositions. The result was so successful that, while
it has remained a stumbling-block for the uninitiated, the work
stands as a major development in symbolic logic and a constant
reference work for the philosophy of science.
The linguistic analysis of Moore and the logical analysis
of Russell were reenforced and given further impetus by the
appearance of a group of thinkers centering at Vienna during and
after World War I. Led by such men as Moritz Schlick (1882-1936)
and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), they developed a school of
thought which was first called logical positivism, and later
logical empiricism. The names are significant because the first
one helps connect their thought to Comte, a connection which they
soon rejected, while the second one helps indicate their attempt
to hold together both reason and experience, but in a radically
different way. Most of the Vienna circle had originally been
scientists, and they approached the problems of knowing from
the point of view of their applicability to the new physical
sciences. While there were differences of interest and emphasis,
and the group disappeared as a school, there was fairly general
agreement among them on a number of important points.
The logical empiricists began their analysis by dividing
the sentences which people utter into two kinds; the meaningful
and the meaningless. A sentence is meaningful only if it expresses
a meaningful statement, whereas a sentence is meaningless if no
such statement is expressed. A meaningful statement is, for them,
one of which the truth or falsity can be ascertained. There are
only two types of such statements. The first includes those which
are true or false because they contain intelligible definitions of
the way in which words or symbols are to be used. Appealing to the
work of Russell in mathematical logic, the logical empiricists can
now show that all statements in arithmetic, including algebra, and
logic are true by virtue of their definitions of the way in which
words or symbols are to be used. For example, two plus two equals
four is merely a definition of the way in which the symbols are
to be used. These definitions are purely linguistic, and have no
reference beyond the range of language at all. The second type of
meaningful statements includes those which are true or false because
they assert matters of fact whose truth is dependent on the possi
bility of their being verified. The statement that it is raining
today can be empirically verified. Such a distinction within mean
ingful statements is closely analogous to the one Hiime made about
the relations of ideas and matters of fact.
The essential point with regard to statements which assert
matters of fact is that they are either themselves directly veri
fiable in sensible experience, or they imply statements which are
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verifiable, A statement is regarded as verifiable when it is
provable in principle, even though not in fact. Thus the geo
graphical features of the side of the moon which is always facing
away from the earth are legitimate objects of meaningful state
ments. What is in fact now unverifiable is verifiable in principle
since trips to the moon are quite conceivable»
The statements most abhorred by the logical empiricists are
those which are not, even in principle, verifiable in sensible
experience, and which nevertheless claim to be more than defi
nitions. Such meaningless statements include especially those of
theology and metaphysics. Also, the statements which express
value judgments, such as those of ethics and aesthetics, are
usually classified as meaningless by the critical school. This
somewhat startling fact results from the argument that value
judgments are not verifiable. We ordinarily refuse to recognize
that something is good or beautiful juist because someone else
approves of it, but we are not able to offer any verifiable
criteria for agreement on the matter. The truth or falsity of
statements containing good or beautiful cannot therefore be
verified. And, if unverifiable, the statements which contain
such judgments are meaningless in the strict logical-empiricist
sense of that word. They are described as emotive "expressions"
of our likes and dislikes and, for this reason, the theory is
often referred to as the "ouch" theory of ethics. It may be a
fact that some people believe that genocide is wrong, but it is
impossible to verify the statement that genocide is wrong. While
the logical empiricist is more than willing to heTp us try to
define what we mean by such terms as "wrong," he refuses to allow
us to interpret statements containing these words as being veri
fiable.

